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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court transferred this matter to this Court pursuant to Rule 
42(a), Utah R. App. P. and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)|j). 
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the district court correctiy determined there was no issue of 
material fact to prevent it from ruling as a matter of law that, Plaintiff/Appellee 
Treena A. Withers (ccWithers"), as the undisputed joint tenant of the subject real 
property, was entitled to partition. 
Standard of Review: The district court's order of summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness, and the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Orvis v. Johnson^ 2008 
UT 2, H 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations omitted). The district court's interpretation of a 
statute is reviewed for correctness. Bear den v. Crofts 2001 UT 76, H5,31P.3d537. 
II. Whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering an equal 
distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the property to the parties as joint tenants. 
Standard of Review: Partition actions are inherently equitable and an 
appellate court will not "substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial court merely 
1 
because [it] may find a different result would be more appropriate.55 Arthur v. 
Chournos, 574 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1978). Trial courts are "accorded broad 
discretion when fashioning [partition decrees], and the decree will be affirmed unless 
the trial court abused its discretion. Gillmorv. Gillmor^ 657 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah 
1982). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
A person who is a joint tenant or tenant in common with another of real 
property may bring an action to partition the property for the benefit of each 
tenant. An action for partition may require the sale of the property if it 
appears that the partition cannot be made without prejudice to the owners. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1201(2008) 
If the court determines that the property or any part of it cannot be 
partitioned without great prejudice to the owners, the court may order the 
property sold. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1212(l) (2008) 
In all cases, the interest of joint tenants shall be equal and undivided. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-5(4) (2008) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of the Case. 
Withers and Defendant/Appellant Marc J. Jepsen ("Jepsen55) were joint 
tenants of a home located on six acres in Boulder, Utah ("Property55). The Property 
2 
is subject to zoning restrictions requiring a residence to be constructed on a least five 
acres. Withers acquired her interest in the Property when Jepsen quit claimed the 
property from himself to Withers and himself as unmarried joint tenants. Using the 
Property as collateral, Withers and Jepsen, as unmarried individuals, applied for and 
obtained a loan secured by a trust deed on the Property. For a period of time the 
parties lived together on the Property, and both invested funds to improve the 
property. After the personal relationship between Withers and Jepsen ended, 
Withers initiated this action to obtain her equal and undivided legal and financial 
interest in the Property. 
Withers filed a motion for summary judgment supported by her affidavit 
("Affidavit") setting forth admissible evidence establishing the joint tenancy and her 
entitlement to partition. The Affidavit set forth the following material facts: 1) the 
parties are joint tenants of the Property; 2) the Property consists of a house on six 
acres; 3) there is a mortgage owing on the home and real property in the 
approximate amount of $65,000.00; 4) the Property appraised for $175,000.00 in 
approximately 2001, prior to the parties making improvements to the house and real 
property; 5) the Property is located in Boulder, Utah; and 6) Property is zoned 
green belt/multiple use. (R. at 126-125). The zoning restrictions require no less 
than five acres per home. (R. at 121-120). These facts were not disputed by Jepsen, 
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who never presented contrary testimony or other admissible evidence.1 
In its Memorandum Decision of October 23, 2008, the district court 
considered the facts established by Withers5 sworn testimony, as well as additional 
facts asserted by Jepsen. (R. at 206-196). The district court ruled that Jepsen had 
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and granted Withers5 Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The court ruled as a matter of law and equity that, as a joint 
tenant of the Property, Withers was entided to partition and, because zoning 
restrictions prevented the Property from being divided in a manner that would 
allow two homes, the only reasonable solution was to sell it and divide the net 
proceeds. 
Following the issuance of the trial court's memorandum decision, Jepsen filed 
a "Motion for Accounting55 and "Objections to Proposed Order.55 (R. at 219-214). 
The Motion for Accounting contained a restatement of the facts contained in the 
Affidavit and the "Other Important Facts55 and arguments contained in Jepsen5s 
1
 Jepsen did not file an affidavit or other admissible evidence to controvert 
facts established by the Affidavit. Jepsen did not file a legal memorandum opposing 
the summary judgment motion. Instead, he filed a document entitled "Objections 
By Defendant to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment55 which included a 
section called "Other Important Facts.55 (R. at 163-129). Jepsen5s "Other Important 
Facts55 consisted of various statements from both parties5 depositions. Notably, 
Jepsen did not dispute facts set forth in the Affidavit. Rather, Jepsen attempted to 
argue that the "Other Important Facts55 created some issue of material fact. 
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other pleadings. The "Objections to the Proposed Order53 asked the court to set 
aside the ordered sale because Withers failed to join the mortgagee. Jepsen also, for 
the first time, asked for an accounting. (R. at 216-215). The district court denied 
this motion, but ordered the sale of the property with an equal distribution of the 
proceeds after satisfaction of the mortgage. (R. at 231-229). 
B, Statement of Facts. 
Withers filed a motion for summary judgment supported by sworn, admissible 
evidence in the form of an affidavit. Her Affidavit contained the following 
undisputed material facts relevant to determining whether she is entided to partition: 
1. Withers and Jepsen are joint tenants of the Property. (R. at 126). 
2. The property consists of a house on six acres. (R. at 125). 
3. There is a mortgage on the property in the approximate amount of 
$65,000.00. (Id.) 
4. The house and real property were appraised for $175,000.00 in 2001 
prior to the parties making improvements to the house arid real property. (Id.) 
5. The house and real property are located within Boulder Town. (Id.) 
6. The lot on which the house sits is zoned green belt multiple use. (Id.) 
Due to the zoning restrictions, residential homes require at least five acres of land. 
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(R. at 121-120). 
Jepsen responded with the "Objections by Defendant to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment.55 (R. at 163-129). In this pleading, Jepsen did not dispute 
Withers5 Affidavit, rather Jepsen agreed "the record title to the real property at issue 
in this case is indeed vested in the names of the parties jointly,55 and included as an 
exhibit, a copy of the executed quit claim deed listing Withers as an unmarried joint 
tenant. (R. at 162, 147). 
Jepsen5s Objections to Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment also 
contained an itemization of Withers5 expenditures toward the Property, including 
her payment of $15,290.00 on the mortgage. (R. at 157). Jepsen did not provide 
the district court with any itemization of his expenses. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1201, when it is no longer desirable for 
parties to remain joint tenants, one of the parties may seek partition. Further, cc[i]f 
the court determines that the property or any part of it cannot be partitioned 
without great prejudice to the owners, the court may order the property sold.55 Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-6-1212(l). In this case, the Property is zoned green belt multiple 
use, which restricts residential structures to one unit per five acre parcel. Because of 
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this zoning restriction, the district court properly ruled that the Property could not 
be physically divided in an equitable manner because one party would end up with a 
house and five acres, and the other with one acre on which a house could not be 
built. As an undisputed joint tenant, the trial court correctly ruled that Withers is 
entitled to partition the Property and that equity was best served by selling the 
Property and dividing the net proceeds equally. 
Jepsen's argument on appeal that an oral contract existed between the parties 
is barred by the statute of frauds. There is no writing between the parties providing 
one would surrender their interest in the property should their relationship fail. 
Indeed, the written document only establishes the contrary arrangement; the quit 
claim deed creates an undisputed joint tenancy between two unmarried individuals. 
Because there is no written agreement stating Withers would surrender her interest 
in the Property should the personal relationship fail, Jepsen's contractual claims are 
barred by the statute of frauds and irrelevant to the partition action. 
The law is clear that cc[i]n all cases, the interest of joint tenants shall be equal 
and undivided.55 Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-5(4). As joint tenants, the parties are both 
entitled to an equal and undivided share of the proceeds from the sale of the 
property. Although Jepsen argued he was entided to an accounting based on his 
"facts and figures55, he never presented any figures other than those Withers 
7 
expended. Moreover, the district court considered Jepsen's arguments and 
determined that an equal distribution of the sale proceeds was the equitable result. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
WITHERS WAS ENTITLED TO INVOKE THE PARTITION 
STATUTE AS AN UNDISPUTED JOINT TENANT OF THE 
PROPERTY. 
The key inquiry is whether the district court correctly determined that Withers 
was an undisputed joint tenant of the Property, thereby entitling her to partition. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §7813-6-1201, "[a] person who is a joint tenant . . . 
may bring an action to partition the property . . . ." Indeed, "[a] co-tenant who has 
properly invoked the aid of this statute is entitled to [partition or sale] as a matter of 
right.55 Barrett v. Vickers, 362 P.2d 586, 587 (Utah 1961). 
The record unequivocally supports the district court's decision that Withers is 
a joint tenant of the Property and entitled to partition. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-13 (2008), "[a] quit claim deed when executed as required by law shall have 
the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and 
to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges, and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, at the date of the conveyance.55 Further, "fee simple is 
presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless it appears 
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from the conveyance that a lesser estate was conveyed.55 Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-3 
(1953). When interpreting deeds cc[i]t is the court's duty to construe the deed as it is 
written.55 Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979). 
Here, the quit claim deed, which Jepsen provided to the district court and is 
attached hereto in the Addendum, conveyed the Property from Jepsen to Withers 
and Jepsen as unmarried joint tenants. (R. at 147). The terms of the deed are 
unambiguous, and uncontroverted. 
Jepsen has never disputed the facts set forth in Withers5 Affidavit. In fact, 
throughout the proceedings, Jepsen has agreed with the facts set forth in Withers5 
Affidavit. In Jepsen5s objections he stated cc[t]he record tide . . . is indeed vested the 
names of the parties jointly.55 (R. at 162). Again, in Jepsen5s brief he states, cc[t]he 
record title to the real property is vested in the parties joindy.55 (Aplt5s Br. at 5). 
Because Withers is an undisputed joint tenant to the Property, she is entitled to 
partition. 
Jepsen5s "contract55 claim failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact because 
it violates the statute of frauds and is irrelevant. Jepsen argues that "contract 
principles can provide appropriate remedies to unravel the affairs of couples who 
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adopt the ways of marriage except the ceremony.55 (Aplfs Br. at 12)2. He argues a 
marital contract was created between him and Withers when they allegedly agreed to 
"jointly finance the home improvements with the new mortgage and [. . .] stay 
together to jointiy retire that obligation.55 (R. at 156). In this case, there is no 
written agreement memorializing the alleged contract, and no legal precedent for the 
court to impose a marital contract on joint tenants absent such a writing. 
Pursuant to Utah's statute of frauds, a party cannot surrender an interest in 
real property without a written conveyance. Section 25-5-1 provides: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property 
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed 
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1(2008) 
Jepsen has provided the court with no written agreement suggesting Withers agreed 
2
 Jepsen5s reliance on Edgar v. Wager, 572 P.2d405, 406 (Utah 1977) is 
misguided because the court in Edgar only applied contract principles to award 
money damages owed as a result of employment related issues. Id 406-407. It does 
not support an argument that the court can impose a marriage contract on two 
people who reside together. Moreover, the court in Edgar like the trial court here 
relied on the partition statute and ordered the sale of the real property. Id (Three 
parties were joint tenants to a house that was sold because partition was not feasible 
without great prejudice). 
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to surrender her interest should their personal relationship fail. Accordingly, 
Jepsen's alleged contract violates Section 25-5-1. 
Because there is no written agreement, Jepsen attempts to manufacture an 
agreement from statements pulled from the parties5 depositions. While Rule 56(e), 
Utah R. Civ. P. allows parties to rely on pleadings and other discovery materials 
when opposing a motion for summary judgment, when a motion for summary 
judgment is supported by an affidavit the adverse party "may not rest upon mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavit or as otherwise 
provided by this rule, must set for specific facts showing this is a genuine issue for 
trial.55 Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); See also, Thomock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 
1979). 
Presumably, because there is no factual or legal basis for dispute, Jepsen 
attempts to shift the focus away from Withers5 legal interest by arguing, "the whole 
issue is whether Withers has any equitable claim to the property.55 (R. at 161). 
However, to support this assertion, Jepsen relied on legal conclusions and irrelevant 
statements pulled from the parties5 depositions: 
Jepsen claims that he and Withers entered into a contract after 
the divorce to jointly finance the home improvements with the 
new mortgage and that they would stay together and jointly 
retire that obligation. Jepsen deposition, page 20. 
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Withers breached her contract with Jepsen by having an 
affair with Jeff Hansen, thus precipitating the separation 
and the end of their relationship. Jepsen deposition, page 
23-25. 
(R. at 156)3. 
Jepsen argues these "sworn statements] [are] sufficient to create an issue of 
fact precluding summary judgment.55 (Aplfs Br. at 10). As the district court 
correctly concluded, however, these statements "contain only the Jepsen5s legal 
conclusions, unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture and belief,55 and do not create a 
genuine issue of material fact. (R. at 201). More importantly, these statements have 
no bearing on Withers5 legal interest in the Property and are irrelevant to this 
partition action. 
A further sampling of Jepsen5s "facts55 reveals their insufficiency to support a 
conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Jepsen5s "Other Important 
Facts55 include historical allegations dating back to his prior marriage to Withers in 
1991, information on Withers5 reproductive history, social security death benefits 
paid to her on behalf of her prior husband, and a $5000.00 cash payment included 
in the parties51998 divorce decree. (R. at 160-159). Jepsen also places great weight 
3
 Even if the court accepted an agreement exists, Jepsen does not suggest 
Withers agreed to forfeit her legal interest in the property if the relationship failed. 
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on the fact the parties were married and divorced for many years before he created 
the joint tenancy. (Aplt's Br. at 10). However, a marriage that ended in 1998 has 
no bearing on a joint tenancy created in 2001. 
Despite the deficiencies in Jepsen's facts, the district court provided a 
summary and analysis of all the facts presented in the pleadings, before classifying 
Jepsen's "Other Important Facts" as "mere background facts" and not relevant to the 
proceedings. (See Mem. Decision. R. at 203-201). Accordingly, based on Withers' 
unopposed Affidavit and the rest of the record, the trial court correctiy ruled that 
Withers is an undisputed joint tenant and entided to partition. 
POINT II THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT ORDERED THE PROCEEDS 
FROM THE SALE TO BE EQUALLY DIVIDED BETWEEN 
THE JOINT TENANTS, AFTER SATISFYING THE 
MORTGAGE OBLIGATIONS. 
Pursuant to Utah's partition statute "partition may require the sale of the 
property if it appears that the partition cannot be made without great prejudice to 
the owners." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1201. "The fundamental objective in a 
partition is to divide the property so as to be fair and equitable and confer no unfair 
advantage on any of the cotenants." Blonquistv. Fmndsen, 694 P.2d 595, 596 (Utah 
1984). The determination of whether a partition can be made "equally among the 
13 
parties . . . without prejudice to the rights and interests of5 the owners is a question 
of fact. United Park City Mines Co., v. Stitching Mayflower Mountain Ponds•, 2006 UT 
35,11 33 (Utah 2006). Partition actions are inherently equitable and an appellate 
court will not "substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial court merely because [it] 
may find a different result would be more appropriate.55 Arthur^ 574 P.2d at 725. 
Furthermore, trial courts are "accorded broad discretion when fashioning [partition 
decrees], and the decree will be affirmed unless the trial court abused its discretion. 
Gillmor, 657 P.2d at 739. 
In this case, the district court considered all the relevant factors before ruling 
that selling the property and equally dividing of the net proceeds was an equitable 
solution. Because of the zoning restrictions, the trial court determined that the 
Property could not be legally or equitably divided without great prejudice to one of 
the parties. Had the district court attempted to partition the Property, the zoning 
restrictions would have left one person with a house and five acres and the other 
with a one acre parcel with no possibility of constructing a home. 
Jepsen argues the district court erred by not providing for equalization or 
"owelty.55 In making this argument, Jepsen introduces Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
1241, for the first time, then faults the district court for this error. Based on this 
argument Jepsen asserts, that had the district court put the "facts and figures on the 
14 
table55 an equitable adjustment would have been made is his favor. (Aplt5s. Br. at 
8) (Citing Barrett v. Vickers, 362 P.2d 586 (Utah I961)("BarrettF). This argument 
is without merit. 
Without addressing whether Jepsen has waived this argument, Jepsen5s 
request for equalization fails because, cc[o]welty is an equitable alternative to [sale by 
partition].554 See, United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT at 11 31. (Owelty is an 
equitable alternative to judicially ordered sale of the property where both parties 
desire to retain an interest in the property.); See also, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
1241 (equalization only applies when cca partition is ordered.55). In this case, because 
of the zoning restrictions, the property could not be legally or equitably partitioned 
without gready prejudicing one of the parties. (R. at 198)5. Therefore, equalization 
or owelty does not apply and the sale of the Property is the only equitable remedy 
under the partition statute. 
Withers is entitled to an equal share of the proceeds because the only written 
4Jepsen raises this argument for the first time on appeal and has, therefore, 
waived it. Even so, § 78B-6-1241 only applies to parcels that can be partitioned and 
since the property cannot be partitioned and must be sold the principle does not 
apply in this case. 
5Because of the zoning restrictions, if one party had been granted the house 
with the required five acres, the other party would have been left with one acre and 
no ability to construct a residence on that acre. 
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documents unambiguously establish that Jepsen intended to convey an equal and 
undivided interest in the Property to Withers. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-
5(2)(a), the grantor must use the words "joint tenancy35 in the conveyance to create a 
joint tenancy between unmarried individuals.6 Jepsen makes much of the fact that 
Withers left him for another man, but marriage was not the basis for the joint 
tenancy. Regardless, the success or failure of their relationship has no bearing on 
Withers5 legal interest and does not diminish her interest. 
Even if the court were to consider Jepsen's untimely and nonresponsive 
pleading submitted after summary judgment had been granted, they do not support 
the result he seeks. In a flurry of pleadings filed on November 24, 2008, Jepsen 
asked the court to set aside the summary judgment. For the first time, he asks for an 
accounting. As the basis for his requested accounting, Jepsen provided the district 
court with Withers5 itemized contributions, including $15,290.00 in mortgage 
payments, yet failed to provide the trial court with an itemization of his alleged 
payments. (Aplt5s. Br. at 6, 10; R. at 157). Jepsen5s best attempt to show he paid 
something toward the mortgage is the assertion that he "made up some of the 
6
 Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 57-1-5(1) (a) joint tenancy is only presumed 
between parties "who are designated as husband and wife in the granting documents 
5? 
16 
delinquent payments/5 without providing any figures for the court to consider. 
(R. at 221). If anything, the facts and figures supplied by Jepsen support an 
equitable adjustment in Withers5 favor. 
Throughout these proceedings Jepsen has made it abundantiy clear that he 
thinks the law has treated him unfairly. In addressing post-partition decree claims of 
unfairness, the Supreme Court has said cc[i]t is no evidence of inequity, as such, that 
one of the co-tenants complains of unfairness once a decree of partition has been 
made.55 Blonquist^ 694 P.2d at 596. While Jepsen clearly wishes for a different 
result, there is nothing in the record suggesting the district court abused its 
discretion by ordering the Property be sold and the net proceeds divided equally. 
Moreover, Jepsen5s untimely and immaterial "facts and figures55 were reviewed and 
considered by the district court in making its equitable decision and found to be 
either immaterial or unpersuasive. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
ordering an equal distribution of the proceeds of the sale. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Withers/Appellee respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the district court's judgment and order granting Withers5 Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Jepsen. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<^*day of June, 2010. 
WILLIAMS-^^UNT 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Treena K. Withers 
187751 1 
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I hereby certify ii^i ^u ;.;ie -'_Ji__ 1^av ot \\-A 
unreel" copies o( the foregoing 1U< \\\V < )!• Ai'TTI 1 IJ1, ilong with i 1 niiitesy 
Brief c i 1 CD, w ei: z i i lai k d b y fir st class o: la i 1, j : osta ge prepa id thereoi i, to: 
Marcus faylor 
671 North Main Street 
Richfield Utah 84701 
A 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
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ADDENDUM 
20 
225459 
'c.mify lilk Company 001) HDIIM tNIHYNO._l.R*ECORDEOfcjJ1.20§l_AT£«>f ^ 
MA,. TAX NOT.CHTO A T ^ Q U E S T O F ^ ^ i i i ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Security 1 itle Coinn in> *— — — — — — ~ * — _ _ _ _ _ 
P. O. Box 177,15 North M mi RECORDER GARFIELD CO, UT 
Panguitch,Ur 8I7SV OEPUFY U J I ^ A A J J ^ ^ I V J ^ 
QUI i" n JJIYI mm* 
MARC J. JEPSEN Grantors 
of BOULDER, County of GAKUELD, Male of Utah, lieieby igH 1 t 1 AIM to 
MAR< J jri'SFN , AN UNMARRIED MAN AND it?H'M\ \ WIIHFR
 h AN UNMARRIED 
WOMAN, AS JOINT 1ENAN IS 
Grantees of 
for the sum of UN DOLLARS and otdu fcood Hid valuable consideration the following hid of land in 
CARFIEI D County, Stale of UTAH 
Beginning at a point 30 chains East and 15 chains South from the Northwest Corner of the Noi tlroi&l 
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter Section 11, Township 33 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence North 330 feet along the Dixie National Forest Boundary; thence West 660 
feet, thence South 330 feet to a fence line; thence East 660 feet along said fence line to the point of 
b< ginning 
U1INI Hi iiiitht itljjantop; Ibis 11 day of JUNT A X) ,2001 
[ARC J J E P S E N ^ ' 
1 I HI OF UTAH 
)ss 
COUNTY OF GARFIELD 
On the » ^J> day of 2001, personally appealed before me th( above named person) 4 and 
the signers of the within tnstrurw nt w IIO duly acknowledged to me tliat they executed the samr 
QMttj flft 
NOTARY PUBLH NOTARY PUBLIC A 
VI) Commission Lxpir* , 
- J Book 3 t ° 
 _Of»u P»" 
